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Thinking is judged by a standard that does not measure up 
to it. Such judgment may be compared to the procedure of 
trying to calculate the nature and powers of a fish by seeing 
how long it can live on dry land. For a long time now, all too 
long, thinking has been stranded on dry land.
—Martin Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism”
There are no classes in life for beginners.
—Rainer Maria Rilke, The Notebooks of 
Make Laurids Brigge
One begins by being confused. A cryptic epigram from Rilke, a heady passage 
from Heidegger, suggesting that conventional paradigms for “thinking” denature 
the activity itself: that’s all you have to go on, for starters. In what follows, I propose 
two defining dimensions of modernist texts: (1) their initial difficulty (one begins 
by being confused), and (2) their experimental departure from earlier conventions 
of thinking. To these two dimensions I would add a third: modernist texts involve 
less a “judging” than a “trying,” in the double sense that they are invested more 
in trying things out than in representing according to normative schemas, and 
that they are trying to read—deliberately so. We do not often like being confused. 
(I return later to the notion of “trying” by trying out Franz Kafka’s The Trial [1925], 
a text that Theodor Adorno characterizes as “the trial of a trial” [1983: 268]—a sort 
of fish unavailable to dry land judgment.)
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Contributors to this volume were invited to take seriously the “and” in its 
title, Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Literature. I take this to mean that at least 
two feasible projects are not invited: either a reading of literature as enabled by 
certain identifiable philosophic positions (literature as a covert rewriting of phi-^ 
losophy), or a reading of philosophy as a species of literature under another name; 
(philosophy’s truth-claiming difference disappearing, postmodern fashion, intJi 
the subjective maw of literature). Instead, the invitation called for a consideration 
of philosophy and literature as distinctive genres—or better, “distinctive kinds 
of attention to human life,” literature involving, as philosophy rarely does, acute 
attention to the representation of particulars.
I intend to use particulars for the basic claims of this argument about modern­
ism. 1 assess neither poetry nor drama here, nor do I say much about the variety of 
fictional strategies that emerge during the period normally glossed as modernism 
(1900s to 1930s). Instead of attempting encyclopedic coverage, I consider in some 
detail the practice of three novelists—Marcel Proust, Franz Kafka, and William 
Faulkner—with the aim of shedding light on central strategies and powers of mod­
ernism.' The philosophical company these writers keep includes Freud and the 
phenomenologists—Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Emmanuel 
Levinas primarily—proposed as company, not as foundational supports. My proj­
ect is to show how the formal practices of my novelists, so to speak, philosophize, 
enact a philosophic stance through their particular way of deploying materials. 
One such way is already before us: modernist fiction’s insistence that one begin by 
being confused alters the traditional genre’s way of staging the figure against the 
ground.
“There are no classes in life for beginners,” the fictional Malte writes in Rilke’s 
The Notebooks of Malte Laurids Brigge (1910), and he continues: “[I]t is always the 
most difficult that is asked of one right away” (1964: 80). The Notebooks bears out 
this claim, immersing the reader in Malte’s confusing notebook entries for (rather 
than his developing understanding of) his unmappable Paris experiences. A fun­
damental difference between life realities and narrative conventions emerges. Life 
unfolds (the verb is too bland) unpedagogically, while narrative centers on peda­
gogic development. Narrative seems primordially structured so as to make sense 
of the human passage through time, to represent it developmentally. To do this, it 
turns “life” into a “life class.” In class, what occurs now (“right away”) prepares us 
(as in narrative) for what is to come. But in life we never exit from a perpetual pres­
ent tense that may—whenever crisis arrives—return us abruptly to an inescap­
able first grade. Almost 70 years before Rilke, Kierkegaard emphasized the same 
radical difference between unpredictable life realities and domesticating narrative 
conventions: “For my part,” Kierkegaard’s Johannes di Silentio claims, “I presum­
ably can describe the movements of faith, but I cannot make them. In learning to 
go through the motions of swimming, one can be suspended from the ceiling in a 
harness and then presumably describe the movements, but one is not swimming” 
(1983:37-38).
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Swimming and “Swimming”
Swimming as opposed to “swimming”: the former occurs only if one is immersed 
in the water of unrehearsable presence, while the latter is learnable by way of a har­
ness and repeated simulation. Might this correlate to a difference between a kind 
of thinking (typically hostile to narrative) that occurs in the water, and a kind of 
thinking (narrative’s bread and butter) that takes place on dry land? Heidegger’s 
analogy, like Kierkegaard’s, is strikingly spatial, so we need to factor in its no less 
crucial temporal component. Narrative is fashioned to escape the unknowing of 
sheer presence—the time frame in which life is actually lived—by providing ret­
rospect, the knowing that graces presence with a perspective available only after 
presence has passed. In the present, if habit fails, we are suddenly unknowing. To 
see how this situation might be represented in its modernist fictional particulars, 
let us try out a scene from the early pages of Kafka’s The Trial (1925). Joseph K. 
has awakened to find two strangers in his room, dressed in apparently coded but 
indecipherable uniforms. They take him into an adjoining room where he is told 
he is under arrest:
“You are only under arrest, nothing more. I was requested to inform you of
this__ That’s enough for today, and we can say good-by, though only for the
time being, naturally. You’ll be going to the Bank now, I suppose?” “To the 
Bank?” asked K. “I thought I was under arrest?” K. asked the question with 
a certain defiance, for though his offer to shake hands had been ignored, he 
felt more and more independent of all these people, especially now that the
Inspector had risen to his feet__ “How can I go to the Bank, if I am under
arrest?” “Ah, I see,” said the Inspector, who had already reached the door. “You 
have misunderstood me. You are under arrest, certainly, but that need not 
hinder you from going about your business. Nor will you be prevented from 
leading your ordinary life.” “Then being arrested isn’t so very bad,” said K., 
going up to the Inspector. “I never suggested that it was,” said the Inspector.
“But in that case it would seem there was no particular necessity to tell me 
about it,” said K., moving still closer. The others had drawn near too. They 
were all gathered now in a little space beside the door. “It was my duty,” said the
Inspector__ “I was assuming that you would want to go to the Bank__ And to
facilitate that... I have detained these three gentlemen here, who are colleagues 
of yours, to be at your disposal.” “What?” cried K., gaping at the three of them.
These insignificant anaemic young men, whom he had observed only as a \
group standing beside tbe photographs, were actually clerks in the Bank, not \ 
colleagues of his—that was putting it too strongly and indicated a gap in the \ 
omniscience of the Inspector—but they were subordinate employees of the 
Bank all the same. How could he have failed to notice that? (1968:14-15) /
What figure-ground relation operates here? How does the passage propose a pic­
ture whose caption might read: “What’s wrong with this picture?” What con­
ventions for representing the human figure in social space and time have been 
subverted?
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The first subverted convention is the reader’s capacity to understand subjects
; and time. We abso­
lutely depend on this capacity (in and out of fictions); a good portion of our social 
intelligence resides in our knowing how to tease out the implications of others’ 
gestures, to catch the false move in an expected sequence. (When, halfway through 
Henry James’s Portrait of a Lady [1881], his protagonist, Isabel Archer, glimpses Gil­
bert Osmond and Madame Merle talking intimately together, he sitting while she 
stands, Isabel deciphers—and we with her—the legible transgression of a social 
code. Neither we nor she is wrong in doing so; a shared code for reading human 
behavior in space and time is operative, and its infraction tells much, tells all.) 
I have much to say later about the philosophic stance buttressing this assumption 
so commonplace as to go unnoticed.
The second convention, also sabotaged here, is that represented space is reliably 
inventoried: not that everything is identified, but that everything pertinent to the 
subject’s orientation is identified. The typical narrator silently performs this task 
of domesticating space in the moment of describing it, making it fit for progressive 
narrative. Kafka breaks this rule: his text is unpredictably “mined,” and the result 
is (in the Freudian sense of the term) uncanny. The three “anaemic young men” 
eventually surge into recognizability well after K. has already entered the room, 
and we ask: How did they get there? Do they belong to the Bank or to K.? How 
can he have “failed to notice” them? (It is more than a question of bad lighting.) In 
the two centuries of realist fiction that precedes Kafka, there is no room that the 
protagonist can enter without the narrator—cannily, expeditiously—identifying 
the pertinent furnishings.
If we resurvey the passage, we note that it is suffused with (what we normally 
take to be) orientational spatial gestures. The Inspector who rises to his feet, reaches 
the door, K. who goes up to him, moves still closer, the others who gather together 
beside the door: all these details that would traditionally facilitate a scene of clari­
fication carry here a tinge of epistemological menace. The orientational assump­
tions of social life dependent on shared spatial convention—the handshake, the 
privacy of the bedroom, the meaning of arrest if it does not signify disruption in 
K.’s ordinary management of space and time—are being sabotaged.
We can generalize this figure/ground further: without orderly space, no 
orderly-time^^withouteither-aTthesermD-subject-development. K. can learn noth­
ing (see Kern 1983).^ Later, while discussing his case with the lawyer Huld, the 
spatial trap is sprung again: “ ‘For example,’ Huld says, ‘there’s a dear friend of 
mine visiting me at this very moment,’ and he waved a hand toward a dark corner 
of the room. ‘Where?’ asked K., almost rudely, in his first shock of astonishment. 
He looked round uncertainly... [a]nd then some form or other in the dark corner 
actually began to stir” (Kafka 1968:104). Not so unmotivated this time: K.’s lapse 
is partially explainable. But the point is that Kafka represents him as no longer in 
perceptual control of his space; he has lost his road map. Other spatial surprises 
abound—the building (it could be any building) where he enters on the fifth floor 
and the hearing is being held, the discovery of court doors in Titoretti’s apartment.
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the performance of the Whipper scene within the precincts of the Bank itself 
There are no classes in life for this Joseph K., who, despite entering his 31st year, is 
incomprehensibly returned to the (dis) orientational state of a beginner. His trial 
unfolds (the verb is too bland) as his being continuously tried by everything that 
happens to him.
What would be at stake in centering modernist narrative on such ongoing 
distress—a state in which none of one’s previous “swimming” lessons has taught 
one how to swim? To answer this, we need to sketch in the several centuries’ his­
tory of Western orientational assumptions and procedures that predate Joseph K. 
and—by privileging canniness—make his sudden incapacity (his being “un-can- 
ed”) so startling. Such assumptions and procedures—constitutive of Enlighten­
ment thought and the realist fiction that body of thought subtends—center on the 
Western drama of a subject coming to know. Although chapter 10 in this handbook 
focuses on the practice of realism, my argument here must briefly rehearse that 
prior practice of representation. Only in response to its operative assumptions can 
we unpack the resonance of modernist unknowing.
Enlightenment Knowing
For a subject to come to know, an Enlightenment premise of reliable correspon­
dence between the individual and the world must operate. Thanks to the prior 
establishment of lawful time and uniform space, a subject can learn to map the 
outer world accurately and, in so doing, achieve inner orientation, as well. Personal 
identity gets confirmed by way of this achieved knowledge of what is out there. On 
this model, the subject who would know and the object to be known are assumed 
to be meant for each other—the latter destined for the former. How did the West 
come to reconceptualize the outer world so that it might enter these conditions of 
knowability?
We might best pursue this question by proposing a composite narrative of 
progress that draws upon four exemplary Enlightenment thinkers: Descartes, 
Newton, Locke, and Kant. Put too schematically, we can say that Descartes initi­
ates the narrative by conceiving the Western subject who would know. Cogito ergo 
sum gives birth—in pure alienation from parents, siblings, church, state, and cul­
ture—to the single knowing subject: res cogitans. His opposite number—the outer 
world now removed from its status as a cosmos of kindred being, and alienated as 
mere material nature awaiting scientific knowledge—is res extensa. Together, res 
cogitans and res extensa make a marriage that launches Western science and, later, 
realist fiction.
The second thinker in this emergent Enlightenment narrative is Newton. His 
“system of the world” proposes a gravitational model that calculates the movement 
of matter in both the farthest heavens and an apple falling from the tree. Newton
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is the Enlightenment’s grand mapmaker. Thanks to his theory of gravitational 
forces, the world—everyone was sure—made rational, secular, knowable sense; it 
had become a universe of calculable forces. (Not that anyone, including Newton, 
understood why gravity operated as it did, but few doubted that it did operate as 
he said it did.)
Descartes conceives the unencumbered rational subject, stripped free of custom 
and—liberated/liberal now—capable of coming to know. Newton makes available 
a lawful, material cosmos, conceptually mastered and open to being known. Miss­
ing still is a narrative for how Descartes’s knowing subject might best learn—in 
time—to negotiate Newton’s knowable world, there before him and awaiting his 
negotiation. Locke’s Essay concerning Human Understanding (1690) supplies this 
narratNe, laying out precisely the story of empirical trial by error—of beginning 
as a blank slate but being capable of knowing more—the story that was to ground 
Western fiction.
Drawing on representative Enlightenment propositions, we have identified the 
birth of an unhampered subject who seeks to know (and who knows how to know: 
by way of doubt), and the authoritative ordering of the material universe (from 
apples to stars) in uniform space and time, its force and motions open to exact 
calculation. Procedure, subject, and setting are in place. Locke takes these and sets 
them in motion by way of a plot that has proved to have abiding appeal—launch­
ing novels and compelling audiences from his time to our own.
The plot goes like this, moving progressively from dawn to day (but rarely far 
into the evening): I am born; I learn swiftly that I do not yet know but am capable 
of knowing; I am not predicated (no inherited schema contains me), but the world 
I inhabit is predicated: knowable by way of trial and error, God-given perhaps but 
secular in its operations; I can learn to negotiate objects and others in the familiar 
space and time of this schema, obtaining property as I go; my doing this confirms 
reflexively my identity as an agent in my own life (property referring simultane­
ously to what I own and to what is “proper to me,” mine alone); I cannot obtain 
everything, but if observant, prudent, and self-aware, I can get what I deserve. 
I am, it seems, everyman. I am also white-male-bourgeois-developmental acquisi­
tiveness. Therefore, one last element is required of this narrative: something that 
will allow it to continue speaking to my projects while at the same time honoring 
my Judeo-Christian conviction that the systematic career of selfhood is an exercise 
not of virtue but of vice. The narrative must be effectively moralized, yet without 
repudiating the earlier givens. This is not only not easy, but probably impossible. 
Enter Kant.
Kant shows, first (in Paul Guyer’s words), “that the validity of both the laws of 
the starry skies above as well as the moral law within had to be sought in the legis­
lative power of human intellect itself” (1992: 2). Legislative: the moral law within 
is as rule driven as Newton’s obedient comets. Second, despite the fact that, as 
material phenomena, we are—like all phenomena—unfree, at our unreachable 
noumenal core we cannot know that we are unfree, and we must therefore, to be 
human, act as though we are free. Thus, Kant arrives at the categorical imperative:
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“Act in such a way that you always treat humanity... never simply as a means, but 
always... as an end” (as cited in Guyer 1992:322). Others conceive and pursue their 
ends, even as I conceive and pursue mine. Newton’s famous Second Law of Motion 
becomes moralized. It is no longer that what I do to you rebounds on me, but 
rather that I am forbidden to encroach on your freedom, even as you are forbidden 
to encroach on mine, for we each have our own motions in mind.^
This Enlightenment narrative is torn by opposed convictions: on the one hand, 
a story of self-flourishing, as far as one can take it; on the other hand, a story of 
self-disciplining, treating others as ends rather than means. Others as ends—a tall 
order for a narrative that has so prioritized the knowing subject, has in fact posited 
the reality of others and objects as knowable only because answerable to the sub­
ject’s categories for knowing them. This is a story in which I come first, in which 
you become recognizable only because you enter into my categories for apprehend­
ing you. You reduce to what I know you as. Levinas—a twentieth-century religious 
thinker and philosopher—repeatedly attacks this story, showing that the subject at 
its center engages in no real risk; everything I encounter eventually reduces to my 
categories for encountering it. Levinas calls this master plot of Western discourse 
“a return to Ithaca,” a return to self-sameness in which all my ventures are, thanks 
to later recognitions, recovered and grounded.
Anatomy of Realism
We may briefly test this Enlightenment narrative—with its contradictory emphases 
on both my flourishing and my need to respect yours—by developing an anatomy 
of fictional realism that resembles it, in four parts: introducing the subject, famil­
iarizing the subject, space and time travel, and recognition. Realist fiction intro­
duces the subject by bringing him close-up. Close-up—like Jane Austen’s Emma 
and Charles Dickens’s Pip—but not too close-up—as Benjy Compson of Faulkner’s 
The Sound and the Fury and Stephen Dedalus of Joyce’s Ulysses are too close-up. 
Reliably close-up, as well: not like Kafka’s Joseph K., whom “someone must have 
traduced, for without having done anything wrong he was arrested one fine morn­
ing”: a narrative situation putting us in a familiar bedroom with the protagonist 
all right, but (as we have seen) there’s something wrong with that room, something 
that was never before wrong with it, something we’re never going to find out. In 
realism, we will find out fully what’s “on his mind” or “in his path.”
Next, familiarizing the subject: the novelistic canvas is immediately peopled 
with others and their social norms. The protagonist’s developing familiarity with 
these others is doubled by the reader’s developing familiarity with them all; the 
capacity to recognize others proceeds swiftly. Not that realism does not deal in 
misrecognitions, but it shapes them mainly in the form of mistakes eventually set 
right—as in Austen’s Pride and Prejudice, a host of Wickhams in time replaced by
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Darcys. Misrecognition in modernism tends to be more stubborn, perhaps irre­
versible; in much postmodernism it is no longer even pertinent.
Next, space and time travel; in realism, the hero and the reader move around a 
lot; such moving around is always pedagogic. The realist world of space and time, 
because lawful, accommodates an incremental series of Lockean trials. Initial 
sightings prepare for later, reliable ones. As Descartes established doubt to be ini­
tiatory, and as Locke stressed ignorance to be the first step toward knowledge, so 
certain entities on the realist canvas will be misread when first presented, so that 
they may be, eventually, accurately reread when re-presented. Anyone observing 
from a neutral position would concur, as though to say, “This is how things are, 
you need not take my word for it.”
Finally, recognition: realism’s sublime moments center on recognition. Con­
sider Pip’s long-withheld encounter with Magwitch, that stormy night in Pip’s 
chambers. Virtually everyone who matters—Miss Havisham, Estella, Magwitch, 
Joe, and most of all Pip himself—comes suddenly into a new and disturbing focus. 
Such recognition scenes appear as crescendo moments of realism—clarifications 
of an entire life, made possible by coming to know one’s world better, and thus 
oneself better.
How does the realist protagonist manage to rise above the flow of his own life 
in time and space, and eventually to see who he really is? Such experience becomes 
fruitful only if the protagonist’s identity is assumed to be a coherence sustained 
throughout time. Time is a disinterested friend of Enlightenment subjectivity; the 
conscious I of the Enlightenment possesses reliable memory. This model of identity 
is atemporal. Pip has to (and can) remember his past accurately, as Maggie Tulliver 
and Anna Karenina suicidally remember theirs. Memory cannot be evaded; real­
ism launches its recognitions by way of that resource: was blind, but now I see.
This is the bread-and-butter story of Western fiction; it moves with a systolic- 
diastolic rhythm of eventual progress and enlightenment, of coming to know the 
territory. Why, and how, do modernist writers refuse this story?
Here are some suggested answers. First, that bread-and-butter story of progress 
can be unbearably smug—and, second, not just smug but colonizing. It assumes 
that the rest of the world is somehow just out there waiting for our getting to know 
it better, to master it better. Its figure/ground model is out of whack: the figure 
(the individual at the center of the narrative) so large, the ground (all that sur­
rounds him/her) so small. John Maynard Keynes once remarked, “I don’t think 
one realises how very discrete (in the mathematical sense) one’s existence is” (as 
cited in Banfield 2000: 112). One’s existence as discrete, infinitesimal within the 
immeasurable field of countless others: you wouldn’t realize this by reading the 
canon of Western realist fiction. Such fiction is committed, as Virginia Woolf put it 
in a gender context, to producing mirrors that make the (male) subject look twice 
his size. Modernism corrects this visual error by puncturing the balloon of male 
project, reducing its sway. Made smaller, the male subject shares a canvas with 
others whom he does not succeed in knowing and converting to dimensions of his 
self-sameness.
3o6 periods and modes
As we have seen, the Enlightenment narrative of coming to know assumes law­
ful time and space as awaiting the mapping energies of a knowing subject. Is this 
everyone’s favorite story because it proposes that we are a species that sustains 
identity in our course through space and time? (Would we still so believe in the 
coherence of personal identity if we did not have numberless narratives telling us, 
“It exists, it really does”?) Western narrative may be shaped primordially to these 
purposes. As Peter Brooks (1984) puts it, narrative “perverts” time by represent­
ing human behavior as a mastering of time by way of achieved self-recognitions: 
returns to Ithaca. I understand such “perversions” to enact a human fiction at once 
necessary and without foundation (or, as James Joyce would say, founded on the 
void). Unlike our nonhuman pets, we do not, and cannot, inhabit a temporality 
wholly unfurnished with the shapings proposed by narrative. We accommodate 
time, perforce, by perverting it.
Jean-Paul Sartre describes this trick in his novel Nausea (1938): “This is what 
I thought: for the most banal event to become an adventure, you must... begin 
to recount it. This is what fools people: a man is always a teller of tales, he lives 
surrounded by his stories and the stories of others... and he tries to live his own 
life as if he were living a story. But you have to choose: live or tell” (1964: 39). Live 
or tell: live a life without knowing how it comes out, or tell a life from the end- 
supplied perspective of knowing how it comes out. The binary is, of course, too 
sharp: a form of living uprooted from every retrospective order provided by telling 
is no form at all, but rather chaos or insanity. Yet the binary lets us grasp a central 
distinction: realism tends to evade precisely this problematic of time, while mod­
ernism seeks to take it head on. Realism knows it is returning to Ithaca. It tells its 
story from the (unannounced) perspective of an Ithaca already returned to: the 
boat is docked before the adventure on the water begins. By contrast, the modern­
ists produce narratives that are difficult precisely because they dislocate the act of 
“telling” so that it might better represent the unmasterable conditions of “living.” 
The moment of now—sheer presence—becomes opaque without the clarifications 
provided by what went before and that prepare for what comes after. Freud is the 
theorist of opaque presence, of subjectivity unmoored from its legible becoming in 
time. He is the doctor of unknowing. For this story in the realm of fiction, we go 
to Proust, Kafka, and Faulkner.
Modernist Unknowing
We begin with some of Freud’s fundamental ideas: defenses and repression as shap­
ing forces guaranteeing that the subject is, at the same time, other than itself; the 
uncanny as a spatial fault line testifying to ego’s “bleeding” into space and warping
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it; trauma as the wound to psyche that makes it inhabit a time frame simultane­
ously then and now (the subject “bleeding” into time). These Freudian concepts 
emerge in the work of Kafka, Proust, and Faulkner as narrative forms (just as real­
ist narrative configures Enlightenment convictions as narrative forms). I do not 
propose Freudian readings; rather, I argue that Freud’s seminal concepts reemerge 
in modernist fictional procedures. Uncanny space turns unlawful; things slip, lose 
their familiarity (or are hauntingly familiar even though unknown). Unbound 
time forfeits linearity; progress comes to a halt. Modernist narrative involves the 
discovery, not of who one is (the drama of knowing), but that one is other. As the 
fictional subject’s compact with reconfirming space and time founders, a poetics 
of knowing cedes to one of unknowing.
One further Freudian term—anaclisis—allows us to measure the stakes of a 
shattered compact between the subject and the outer world. In seeking to under­
stand the origin of sexual instincts, Freud distinguishes between anaclitic and 
autoerotic activities.^ Freud’s narrow distinction is between the earliest infantile 
instincts that “lean upon” the mother’s milk itself, and a later separation/sexual- 
izing of these instincts as they move away from any necessary object. (First, the 
infant instinctively seeks the life-sustaining milk, and then, more playfully, the 
breast that contains the milk but is gradually becoming a sexualized object in 
itself, and thereafter any number of potentially sexualized objects unconnected 
with “milk”—a trajectory that launches the unplotted history of human sexual­
ity.) The term “anaclitic” has, however, taken on a larger reference. It describes 
not the instinct’s “leaning,” but rather the infant’s “leaning”—in Jean Laplanche’s 
terms—“on the object, and ultimately a leaning on the mother” (1985:16, emphasis 
original). “Leaning on the mother”; anaclisis figures a sort of elemental socializing 
or bonding between infant and mother. More broadly, I read as anaclisis the rela­
tion of the subject to already familiar space, space previously “leaned on” and made 
safe by association, so to speak, with the mother’s breast, space located on the path 
of ego maturation.^ Uncanny space, by contrast, is space removed from familiarity, 
no longer breast-sanctioned, space you can do nothing with—like the space you 
find yourself in, for example, when you’ve become a noxious insect and your own 
bedroom is suddenly a prison.
When the unthinkingly anaclitic pact between knowing subject and famil­
iar world collapses, space and time, “here” and “now,” no longer function as law­
ful, cooperative frames for being. The Enlightenment drama of a subject coming 
to know ceases to operate. In such conditions, the subject itself—“I”—alters as 
well. A microscopic and ceaseless traffic among all three terms—subject, space, 
time—replaces the more easily manageable figure/ground polarity implicit in the 
drama of the singular Cartesian subject. In the older Enlightenment model, a fore­
grounded res cogitans moves through doubt and learns to gauge accurately a back­
grounded res extensa. By contrast, modernism’s representational schema draws 
on different tenets, produces a different figure/ground—one that might best be 
understood as phenomenological.
3o8 periods and modes
Modernist Representation and 
Phenomenology
Since my argument centers on the philosophizing enacted through literary 
form, 1 only sketch here some basic phenomenological tenets. A range of late- 
nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century Western thinkers (F. H. Bradley, Henri 
Bergson, Franz Brentano, and Edmund Husserl among them) were engaged in 
reconceptualizing the embodied subject’s ways of inhabiting and registering 
the exterior world. Oversimplifying, one may say that, in their work, individ­
ual consciousness appears less as the separate subjective lens through which a 
Hume would despair of arriving at lawful objective conclusions, and more as 
the participatory “field” within which world apprehension continuously occurs. 
Consciousness and the world preengage each other, producing in individuals 
the experience of a lifeworld. Husserl claims that our minds never grasp “the 
matter straight out,” but rather how things “ ‘appear.’ For this reason, they are 
called ‘phenomena,’ and their most general essential character is to exist as 
the ‘consciousness-of’ or ‘appearance-of’ the specific things” (1973: 50). With 
Heidegger’s publication oiBeing and Time (1927), phenomenology emerges (and 
for the next two decades remains) as a major current in European philosophy, 
marking the existentialist thought of Gabriel Marcel, Merleau-Ponty, Levinas, 
and Sartre.
1 make no claim as to influence. (It is likely that, apart from Proust’s knowing 
some of Bergson’s work, none of my novelists read these philosophers.) Rather, 
I seek to disengage some common intuitions that shape my writers’ representa­
tional strategies, and one leaps into view. In modernist fictional practice things 
tend (more aggressively than in realism) to enter representation as perceived or 
“intended” by consciousness. Of course. Enlightenment thought also understands 
the subject’s grasp on the object as phenomenal alone, but subject and object—an 
immaterial res cogitans and a material res extensa—remain oppositional terms. By 
contrast, phenomenology stresses the mental framing of world perception so as to 
bond inseparably subject and object; subject and world are “hard-wired” into each 
other.
As Merleau-Ponty puts it, this is, pace Descartes, “a philosophy for which 
the world is always ‘already there’ before reflection begins—as an inalienable 
presence” (1973: 72). I am always inserted in the world; all my analyses of it are 
affected by that preobjective insertion.*’ Merleau-Ponty again;
It is because it is a preobjective view that being-in-the-world can be 
distinguished from every third person process, from every modality of the res 
extensa, as from every cogitatio, from every first person form of knowledge— 
and that it can effect the union of the “psychic” and the “physiological.”... We 
must therefore avoid saying that our body is in space, or in time. It inhabits 
space and time. (1999:152,155)
MODERNISM 309
“Here I am,” in phenomenologically oriented modernist fiction, means not that a 
separate “I” happens to find itself in space and time, but that the (embodied) “I” 
cannot be responsibly thought apart from the space and time it always inhabits. 
In this cohabiting, a certain subset of res extensa—one’s body—gets reconceptual­
ized as the inalienable grounding of res cogitans: not alien body but lived body. As 
Heidegger puts it in his study of Nietzsche, “we do not ‘have’ a body; rather, we 
are ‘bodily’ ” (as cited in Merleau-Ponty 1999:124). With a different set of assump­
tions, Freud arrived at a similar view. The body “speaks” the being, “speaks” it 
more revealingly, often, than the mind.
“Here I am,” an incarnate being moving in space/time. In realism, the sub­
ject’s capacity for movement is taken for granted; the narrative focuses instead on 
res cogiians’s various projects. In phenomenologically inflected fiction, however, 
the details of the embodied subject’s lifeworld—an array of orientational arrange­
ments prior to, more intimate than, the pursuit of projects—become inexhaustibly 
pertinent. These writers are more likely to attend to the elemental world-furnish­
ing that makes human being possible. Heidegger writes:
When we speak of man and space, it sounds as though man stood on one side,
space on the other. Yet space is not something that faces man__ Spaces, and with
them space as such—“space”—are always provided for already within the stay of 
mortals.... To say that mortals are is to say that in dwelling they persist through 
spaces by virtue of their stay among things and locations. (1977a: 334-35)
Levinas understands this primordial insertion of embodied being into familiar 
space/time as enjoyment itself—that unthinking orientational confidence that 
I have been calling anaclitic. Levinas writes:
Dwelling is the very mode of maintaining oneself... as the body that... holds 
itself up and can— The “at home” is not a container but a site where I can, 
where, dependent on a reality that is other, I am, despite this dependence or 
thanks to it, free. It is enough to walk, to do, in order to grasp anything, to 
take— The site, a medium, affords means. Everything is here, everything 
belongs to me—The possibility of possessing, that is, of suspending the very 
alterity of what is only at first other, and other relative to me, is the way of the 
same. I am at home with myself in the world because it offers itself to or resists 
possession. (1969:37-38)
If these two passages seem familiar in their claims—however unfamiliar their 
vocabulary—it means that they reprise an assumption about the subject in space/ 
time already central to realist protocols: that human being is at home there. Taken 
for granted and therefore unspoken in Enlightenment thought, that assumption 
gets articulated—put into thought—in twentieth century phenomenology, allow­
ing us to see writ large the anaclitic dimensions of our pact with space/time.
Yet a crucial difference obtains in the later schema. The phenomenological 
model binds subject, space, and time as radically interdependent terms (whereas 
Enlightenment thought, Cartesian-wise, grasped the subject as essentially free of 
its setting). No embodied subjects without immersion in space/time; no absolute
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space/time indifferent to embodied subjects. The terms are wholly correlative. 
Finally—and this is the point I have working toward—the articulation of subject/ 
space/time as radically bonded carries with it the possibility of the bond’s rupture. 
In Enlightenment thought neither such a pact nor its rupture is readily conceiv­
able. By contrast, much modernist philosophy and fiction engages this intimate, 
moment-by-moment pact (“here I am”) by way of exploring its rupture. Indeed, 
the shattering of the subject/space/time bond is the signature event in the mod­
ernist fiction under discussion. Levinas has already let us see how this scenario 
of at-home-ness—furnishedness—sustains itself by converting the alterity of the 
other into dimensions of the same. What is modernist shock if not the arrival of an 
alterity that cannot be so converted?
Before resuming that analysis by way of the assaulted modernist subject, let us 
stay with Levinas’s terms a bit longer. Although his concern is philosophical rather 
than literary, he identifies the logic that drives progressive realist motion through 
space and time. The wayfaring subject, engaging a set of suspended obstacles (alter­
ity), eventually manages to negotiate these obstacles, converting them into a con­
tinuation of the same. In so doing, he returns home. In these terms, realism is the 
infinitely rewritable story of Ulysses making his way through alterity as he heads 
toward Ithaca. This drama of turning other into self—of coming to possess it as 
knowledge, as challenge met and resolved—is, as I argued above, the Ur-narrative 
of Western realist fiction and Enlightenment philosophy.
Finally, Levinas characterizes not just the logic and the temporality of realist 
representation, but its seductiveness, as well:
[We are dealing with] an experience always anticipated and consented to.... The 
given enters into a thought which... invests it with its own project, and thus 
exercises mastery over it. What affects a consciousness presents itself at a distance 
from the first... is represented, does not knock without announcing itself, leaves, 
across the interval of space and time, the leisure necessary for a welcome. What 
is realized in and by intentional consciousness offers itself to protention and 
diverges from itself in retention, so as to be, across the divergency, identified and 
possessed. This play in being is consciousness itself: presence to self through a 
distance, which is both loss of self and recovery in truth. (1998:101-2)
Attended to with sufficient care, this knotty description reveals the temporality 
of realist plot as an unfolding of experiences anticipated, consented to, accommo­
dated, eventually mastered. Knock, knock; who’s there? Realism informs us who, 
maintains the good manners of announcing the intrusion in advance and provid­
ing time for it to be appropriately welcomed. The other then enters the field of 
intentional consciousness as something partly recognizable in advance (it permits 
protention), as well as something rewardingly recognized later as slightly different 
(its retention in consciousness is corrective). Across this divergency—the other’s 
manageable alteration over the time of encounter—the other is “identified and 
possessed,” becoming, for the subject thus encountering it, an event in the career 
of the same. Finally, this game of the subject’s loss and recovery—of consciousness 
at first inadequate to its encounters but eventually adequate to them—enacts the
MODERNISM 311
temporality that “grounds” identity: to lose and then to recover oneself by engag­
ing others in ongoing time just is identity. Time—^within the anaclitic realm of 
realism—is the medium in which, encountering others, we (re) become ourselves.
I have entered into this discussion of phenomenology because Enlightenment 
philosophy—be it idealist or empirical—is typically unprepared to analyze the 
teeming traffic that occurs at this microscopic level of “here I am.” Its epistemolog­
ical project is focused elsewhere. To recognize what is at stake when this obscure 
traffic goes awry and orientation/ails, I have briefly drawn from the work of Heide­
gger, Merleau-Ponty, and Levinas. Despite his insistence on human furnishing, 
Heidegger concedes that orientation may fail. “In anxiety, we say, ‘one feels ill at 
ease [es ist einem unheimlich].’.. .'We can get no hold on things. In the slipping 
away of beings only this ‘no hold on things’ comes over us and remains” (1977b: 
103). Unheimlidv. the reverse of canniness, of the “I can” of intentional identity. 
David Krell glosses this negative liability in Heidegger as follows: “Such intricate 
contexts of meaning—which are usually implicit in our activities and become vis­
ible only when something goes wrong, when the hammer breaks or the bulb burns 
out—constitute what Heidegger calls ‘world’” (1977: 20).
The broken hammer, the burned-out bulb, the interrupted enjoyment of a 
“world”: when our subject/space/time contract shatters, “here I am^’ shifts from 
capacitation to arrest, from orientation to errance and obsession. “Obsession tra­
verses consciousness countercurrentwise,” Levinas writes,
is inscribed in consciousness as something foreign, a disequilibrium, a
delirium In the form of an ego, anachronously delayed behind its present
moment, and unable to recuperate this delay—that is, in the form of an ego 
unable to conceive what is “touching” it, the ascendency of the other is exercised 
upon the same to the point of interrupting it, leaving it speechless. (1998:101)
Space here becomes opaque (I cannot name what is “touching” me), time loses its 
“re-presentational” docility (I cannot catch up with what is marking me and will 
not release me). Such a subject has exited from the soothing familiarity that Levi­
nas calls “the disappearance of what could shock” (1969:124). This is the subject 
who claims our attention in the work of Kafka, Proust, and Faulkner. Wherever 
he is going, it is not to Ithaca. His distress registers an unknowing penetrated by 
anxiety, an unpreparedness fraught with fear and trembling.
Time and Space as Trouble 
IN Modernist Fiction
I indicated at the opening of this chapter that I would proceed, as fiction itself 
proceeds, by way of compelling particulars. Let us consider now, in uninterrupted 
slow motion, the particulars of temporal trouble—of trauma—in Proust. Such
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trauma unfolds (the verb is too bland) as a breaching of the intersubjective bonds 
we unthinkingly require in order to be at all. Reduced to merely oneself, the subject 
fails to cohere. Lack reasserts itself whenever the anaclitic frame (within which we 
experience the world outside ourselves as familiar, reliable, breast-sponsored) rup­
tures. Proust’s most moving instance of this dynamic occurs when Marcel, anx­
ious about his grandmother’s health, comes upon her unannounced:
Alas, it was this phantom that I saw when, entering the drawing-room before 
my grandmother had been told of my return, I found her there reading. I was 
in the room, or rather I was not yet in the room since she was not aware of 
my presence, and, like a woman whom one surprises at a piece of needlework 
which she will hurriedly put aside if anyone comes in, she was absorbed in 
thoughts which she had never allowed to be seen by me. Of myself—thanks 
to that privilege which does not last but which gives one, during the brief 
moment of return, the faculty of being suddenly the spectator of one’s oWn 
absence—there was present only the witness, the observer, in travelling coat 
and hat, the stranger who does not belong to the house, the photographer 
who has called to take a photograph of places which one will never see again.
The process that automatically occurred in my eyes when I caught sight of my 
grandmother was indeed a photograph. We never see the people who are dear 
to us save in the animated system, the perpetual motion of our incessant love 
for them, which before allowing the images that their faces present to reach 
us, seizes them in its vortex and flings them back upon the idea that we have 
always had of them, makes them adhere to it, coincide with it. How, since into 
the forehead and the cheeks of my grandmother I had been accustomed to read 
all the most delicate, the most permanent qualities of her mind, how, since 
every habitual glance is an act of necromancy, each face that we love a mirror 
of the past, how could I have failed to overlook what had become dulled and 
changed in her, seeing that in the most trivial spectacles of our daily life, our 
eyes, charged with thought, neglect, as would a classical tragedy, every image 
that does not contribute to the action of the play and retain only those that 
may help to make its purpose intelligible. But if, instead of our eyes, it should 
happen to be a purely physical object, a photographic plate, that has watched the 
action, then what we see, in the courtyard of the Institute, for example, instead 
of the dignified emergence of an Academician who is trying to hail a cab, will 
be his tottering steps, his precautions to avoid falling on his back, the parabola 
of his fall, as though he were drunk or the ground covered in ice. So it is when 
some cruel trick of chance prevents our intelligent and pious tenderness from 
coming forward in time to hide from our eyes what they ought never to behold, 
when it is forestalled by our eyes, and they, arriving first in the field and having 
it to themselves, set to work mechanically, like films, and show us, in place 
of the beloved person who has long ago ceased to exist but whose death our 
tenderness has always hitherto kept concealed from us, the new person whom 
a hundred times daily it has clothed with a loving and mendacious likeness.
And—like a sick man who, not having looked at his own reflexion for a long 
time, and regularly composing the features which he never sees in accordance 
with the ideal image of himself that he carries in his mind, recoils on catching 
sight in the glass, in the middle of an arid desert of a face, of the sloping pink 
protuberance of a nose as huge as one of the pyramids of Egypt—I, for whom
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my grandmother was still myself, I who had never seen her save in my own soul, 
always in the same place in the past, through the transparency of contiguous 
and overlapping memories, suddenly, in our drawing-room which formed part 
of a new world, that of time, that which is inhabited by the strangers of whom 
we say “He’s begun to age a good deal,” for the first time and for a moment only, 
since she vanished very quickly, I saw, sitting on the sofa beneath the lamp, 
red-faced, heavy and vulgar, sick, vacant, letting her slightly crazed eyes wander 
over a book, a dejected old woman whom I did not know. (1981, 2:141-43)
Freud understands trauma as a breaching of the psyche’s defenses sufficiently vio­
lent to cause unmanageable distress. The psychic system, overwhelmed, fails to 
reorder itself, thus revealing how progressive time itself is dependent on the func­
tioning of the intentional ego. As the ego loses its resourcefulness, so movement 
in time loses its linearity. One enters, as it were, a state of fibrillation; purposive 
behavior ceases. A trap in the past has been resprung. Proustean trauma arises 
otherwise. It involves not a collapse into the suddenly reemerged and engulfing 
past, but rather an unbearable recognition of one’s present. In the space of a single 
moment, Marcel sees something traumatizing: what does he see?
First, he sees that seeing itself is reciprocal (a shared pact rather than a pri­
vate resource), and therefore without guarantee, liable to collapse. All his former 
seeings of his grandmother have been unknowingly conditioned upon a recipro­
cal seeing-back that underwrote their value. Her inestimable value resides in this 
mutual seeing; he remains Marcel so long as she remains his grandmother. But her 
physical insertion in space and time makes her, at the same time, a being continu­
ously altering and materially unreachable—a situation repressed by the needs of 
sanity itself, but unfortunately revealed in this untoward moment. Looking at her 
not looking at him, he discovers himself as “the spectator of [his] own absence.” 
Literally, he is not there in her field of vision; more deeply, he is not there unless 
sanctioned by her field of vision. Uncorroborated, he gazes at his own absence. 
Insofar as all oriented human being depends upon the unthinking sponsorship 
of others, Marcel momentarily ceases to be. Need it be said that no realist novel 
entertains these quietly terrifying notions, that no realist novel fails to deliver the 
drama of coherent individuation? If, as Adorno proposed, modernist art “brings to 
light what is infantile in the ideal of being grown up” (1997:43), Proust reveals what 
is grown up in thinking through the aporias of subjective interdependency.
“How could I have failed to overlook...?” Marcel asks, and we remember 
Joseph K.’s suddenly distressful “How could he have failed to notice that?” In the 
Kafka example, space suddenly becomes opaque, closed to subjective mastery. In 
the Proust example, time lurches into view, complicating what had seemed to be 
only a familiar entity in space. Marcel realizes that for the longest time now he 
has not been seeing his actual grandmother. He has been seeing her as though his 
commerce with her in space were time-free; but a photographic lens is ruthlessly 
time-focused, on the present. The pathos of the passage resides in the fact that it 
takes her not seeing him, for him to see her, for once, as she is. There is no iterative 
becoming here, no cozy continuity of being-in-time. Rather, there is a convulsive
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alteration, lasting a moment only, and then the curtain drops again. She appears 
once more as what she used to be. The disinterested camera, capturing only what is 
actually there, registers (in Proust’s model) the world as seen without a self, intol­
erably up-to-date. More, the inhumanity of this disinterested gaze is potentially 
Marcel’s as well, the camera merely an alibi.
The unfurnished grandmother appears with unmatchable distinctness here, 
bathed in the estranging and disfiguring medium of time. To see her like this is 
to recognize all human being in space as continuously time-marked, and to real­
ize that the normal time-coefficient for such seeing is long out-of-date, the act of 
seeing “an act of necromancy.” The passage speaks of “a new world, that of time,” 
which is “inhabited by strangers.” Though Proust uses the phrase “^res de fuite” 
only for beings in the field of desire, we grasp here its larger resonance. A stranger, 
his grandmother is being whisked away from him in time, no less than her body 
will later be (faculty by faculty) taken from her during her illness. In time there are 
only decomposing strangers headed for unspeakable destinations. The passage’s 
ultimate message is unknowing, “a dejected old woman whom I did not know. 
What bursts forth in Proustean trauma is not the Freudian return of the repressed 
but the rupture of the time-annealing intersubjective compact.^ The present breaks 
through—it breaches—and all is disfigured. Marcel sees that, unknowing, he has 
all along been seeing the past in place of the present. In this moment he becomes 
a stranger—to the loved one, to himself—for the new seeing (the past as past, the 
present as present) is not bearable (and mercifully not there for long: Proustean 
subjects falsify time as they falsify space, necessarily, involuntarily). Thus undone, 
it is Marcel who emerges as “the stranger who does not belong to the house.”
The psychic operation in Proustean trauma is eviction from the familiar—a 
forced relinquishment of the maternal breast. The passage insistently reminds us 
that, as the pact is mutual, the damage done to her registers in him. The analo­
gies offered—the tottering Academician, the sick man—point to a male subject. 
Indeed, the sick man whose strategies consist in eluding awareness of his own ill­
ness figures less the grandmother than Marcel himself, perpetually buoyed by the 
reciprocal love of mother and grandmother, ignoring his irreversible physical pas­
sage through time. Deprived of his outdated, supportive mirror, he is forced to see 
himself in uncanny fashion, to catch up with himself: the nose as huge as a pyramid 
weirdly intimating the momentarily emergent, detested Jew in Proust himself—the 
Jew otherwise concealed, or projected outward upon Swann, Bloch, and others.® 
Such glimpses, however they differ from each other, imply the same collapse—a 
falling back upon one’s always inadequate personal resources, a return to incurable 
lack. Indeed, all such Proustean scenes of collapse rehearse the original ejection of 
Marcel from his mother’s kiss, his mother’s breast, his mother’s womb.
None of this unfolds as realism, for it forfeits the Cartesian premise of res 
cogitans, an independent entity capable (through clear and distinct reasoning) of 
accurately mapping others in space and time.* Proustean time is not a transparent 
medium within which one progressively pursues one’s project. Or, rather, one can 
do this, one does do this, and the work of the Proustean text is to reveal its terminal
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inauthenticity. Terminal in the sense of permanent nonarrival: one cannot arrive 
in Proust (as Tom Jones, Pamela Andrews, Elizabeth Bennet, Eugene Rastignac, 
and Rodion Raskolnikov all arrive at their appropriate destinations). But one can 
go back—find out where one has been, even who one has been. In all this we find a 
rebuke of bourgeois plotting, a repudiation of instrumental achieving—an under­
mining of the Enlightenment-inspired projecting (attempted, failed, revised) that 
constitutes the main business of Western realism for more than 200 years.
What might Kafkan realism look like (if one could fantasize it)? I suspect it 
would center on the unfolding career of the Assistant Manager in The Trial. This 
figure—ambitious to rise to the top of his career ladder, unquestioning as to the 
ends that motivate his effort (focused wholly on the means of arrival)—has no 
trouble with space, time, or others. His compact is unshakable. Spiritually empty, 
he embodies his culture’s materialist norms, and (if asked) he would say what the 
chief clerk says to a suddenly disabled Gregor-turned-giant-insect: “[T]his is not 
the season of the year for a business boom, of course, we admit that, but a season 
of the year for doing no business at all, that does not exist, Mr. Samsa, must not 
exist” (Kafka 1995: 77-78). Time as money is the convention within which worldly 
projects are pursued, attained, failed, or revised. One fine day he will die, but the 
Assistant Manager will not experience his death until then. His world makes sense, 
it has a plot, that plot is realism.
As all readers of Kafka know, nothing happens this way. In place of the Assis­
tant Manager, we find figures like Georg Bendemann and Gregor Samsa and Joseph 
K. Although they themselves are unsurprising (how often they long to become 
Assistant Managers!), their pathway suddenly becomes a thicket of surprises. Noth­
ing is any longer what it was; even an innocent bank storage room can now house 
a lurid scene of whipper and victims. It is as though an all-transforming report 
had been issued off-stage, terminating the successful deployment of habit, career, 
project. Canniness no longer applies; nothing is any longer reliably familiar.
As for Faulkner, he seems to have taken seriously Nietzsche’s remark (which he 
never read): “I’m afraid we are not rid of God because we still have faith in gram­
mar” (1954: 483). Faulkner invents an entire rhetoric for saying trauma—for word­
ing psyches under assault and immersed in space/time in ways unpremeditated by 
Newtonian realism. The subject shatters, lives incoherently a scene occurring both 
then and now. To see how this undoing occurs, let us examine (once more in the 
uninterrupted slow motion of compelling particulars) young Joe Christmas from 
Light in August (1932)—rushing from a scene of violence at the dancehall to Bob­
bie’s room, thinking to elope with her:
He knocked. There was a light in her room, and another at the end of the hall,
as he had expected; and voices from beyond the curtained windows too__ He
knocked again, louder, putting his hand on the knob, shaking it, pressing his
face against the curtained glass in the front door. The voices ceased__ He
knocked again... he was still knocking when the door... fled suddenly and 
silently from under his rapping hand. He was already stepping across the 
threshold as if he were attached to the door, when Max emerged from behind
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it, blocking it. He was completely dressed, even to the hat. “Well, well, well,” he 
said. His voice was not loud, and it was almost as if he had drawn Joe swiftly 
into the hall and shut the door and locked it before Joe knew that he was 
inside. Yet his voice held again that ambiguous quality, that quality hearty and 
completely empty... like a shell, like something he carried before his face and
watched Joe through it__ “Here’s Romeo at last,” he said. “The Beale Street
Playboy.” Then he spoke a little louder..,. “Come in and meet the folks.”
Joe was already moving toward the door which he knew, very nearly running
again, if he had ever actually stopped__ suddenly he saw the blonde woman
standing in tbe hall at the rear. He had not seen her emerge into the hall at all, 
yet it was empty when he entered. And then suddenly she was standing there.
She was dressed, in a dark skirt, and she held a hat in her hand. And just beyond 
an open dark door beside him was a pile of luggage, several bags. Perhaps he did 
not see them. Or perhaps looking saw once, faster than thought I didn’t think she 
would have that many Perhaps he thought then for the first time that they had 
nothing to travel in, thinking How can I carry all those. But he did not pause, 
already turning toward the door which he knew. It was only as he put his hand 
on the door that he became aware of complete silence beyond it, a silence which 
he at eighteen knew that it would take more than one person to make. But he did 
not pause; perhaps he was not even aware that the hall was empty again, that the 
blonde woman had vanished again without his having seen or heard her move.
He opened the door. He was running now; that is, as a man might run far 
ahead of himself and his knowing in the act of stopping stock still. The waitress 
sat on the bed as he had seen her sitting so many times. She wore the dark dress 
and the hat, as he had expected, known.... And in the same instant he saw the 
second man. He had never seen the man before. But he did not realise this now.
It was only later that he remembered that, and remembered the piled luggage in 
the dark room. (1985: 555-56)
This is not Kafka’s boarding-house room where you perceive only inadequately 
who is there, yet the subject-space contract operative in realism is no less fun­
damentally revoked. What in the Kafkan encounter emerges as anxiety registers 
in Faulkner as velocity and incomprehension. Joe is traveling, as it were, at more 
than human speed—faster than thought can keep up with—and he runs pell-mell 
into disaster. Nothing in this space—which nevertheless had earlier been perfectly 
familiar—answers to his expectations. He encounters, with a vengeance, the “bro­
ken hammer” and “burned out bulb.” The door opens suddenly, pulling Joe as of 
its own accord, and Max emerges, dressed for a purpose Joe is too rushed to worry 
about not understanding. Max’s words, with their racist barb, are likewise incom­
prehensible, but Joe can’t attend to them, is moving too fast to register anything 
accurately. The blonde woman appears and disappears, jerkily, the representation 
of her movement aligned with Joe’s heaving sensory apparatus rather than with her 
own deliberations. Joe’s consciousness may be intentional in the phenomenologi­
cal sense, but it lacks intention in any other sense. He is unbearably unfurnished. 
In this definitive moment of his life—Joe’s 15 years on the road follow hard on this 
traumatic encounter—he can get nothing straight, just registers, camera-like, the 
incomprehensible sense-data coming at him. Why are they dressed this way? How 
can he carry all those bags? Who is this stranger?
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He doesn’t so much think these questions as become, fleetingly, penetrated 
by them one after the other, like events on a speeding movie reel, each one just 
short of enough repetitions to permit coherent representation. The entire scene is 
punctuated with “perhaps”; the narrative act refuses to sort out Joe’s spatial/tem­
poral experience, to reduce it to retrospective epistemological order. (Retrospec­
tive arrangement in Faulkner tends to be ideological rather than accurate.) When 
the encounter is over, he’s on the floor, abandoned and bleeding profusely: he has 
learned nothing. His final moment will repeat this one: again flat out on the floor, 
castrated and with his life pouring out of him, still having learned nothing. Light in 
August is fiercely nonpedagogic. Again, the cinema analogy is pertinent: the sound 
and fury of experience exploding upon the subject (in the subject) in the form 
of unmasterable encounters, at a pace faster than thought can digest. Conscious­
ness, despite Enlightenment guarantees of accountability, is a defective resource 
for mapping these spatial/temporal events.
Faulkner’s experimental rhetoric savages the decorum of realism’s gathered 
subject-verb-predicate; the reader is hurled unprepared into the nongrammatical 
turmoil of the text. When, later in Light in August, Joe walks toward Joanna Burden’s 
dark house, about to commit the central act of the novel—to slit her throat—he 
thinks not “I am going to do something” (the basic syntax of agency: subject moving 
through verb and affecting object), but rather “Something is going to happen to me” 
(1985: 486). “Something” is the subject, not Joe. He does not know what he is on the 
edge of doing; he can conceptualize it only as a shapeless yet monstrous event about 
to happen to him, not her. The “central act,” I called it, and therefore the act that 
every reader feels compelled to assess. But an act requires an actor, and Faulkner’s 
syntax represents Joe as acted-upon, not agent: how judge him at this moment?
Faulkner’s great work shares with modernist fiction more generally a refusal to 
indulge in the fatuity, so to speak, of a judgment-centered stance toward its materi­
als. If reason-governed “trial” is a central activity fueling realism—a careful trying 
of the materials over time, to get them (and thus oneself in relation to them) into 
finer focus—then it is telling that perhaps the most famous modernist novel turns 
“trial” on its head. Kafka’s Trial enacts, as Adorno put it, “the trial of a trial”: a 
trial of the subject’s capacity to know, to convert the other outside itself into an 
adventure of the same. Joseph K. learns no more about his trial, at novel’s end, than 
he knew when it began. Likewise, Joyce’s Bloom learns nothing in his 24 hours, 
Mann’s Castorp passes his seven years atop the mountain as in a heady yet person­
ally weightless parenthesis, Proust’s Marcel is stuck for several thousand pages in a 
fluid time zone somewhere between childhood and early manhood. These novels 
refuse, like Faulkner’s, to grant their protagonists the ever more accurate judg­
ments that constitute maturation.
For such modernists, the underlying drama of the subject that countless realist 
novels deploy and redeploy—^yet another story of the “I” of “I can”—has revealed 
its parochialism. This well-worn story of Ulysses heading home remains enclosed 
within a self-certainty incompatible with the trial of spirit itself. Such certainty—in 
Levinas’s terms—“remains the guide and guarantee of the whole spiritual adven­
ture of being. But this is why this adventure is no adventure” (1998: 99)- To stage
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an adventure that would really be one, modernists must go beyond the repertory of 
narrative moves sanctioned by realism, for realism assumes the continuity of cul­
tural norms (norms open to tweaking as a protagonist moves progressively in famil­
iar space/time). It remains friendly to its reader: it presupposes a shared and viable 
world. It is of limited help if, as a writer, you want to make a great deal of trouble.
I conclude by returning to time as trouble. Trouble tends to be mounted in 
realism so as to be surmounted; it is a distracting force field presented in order 
to be removed—like dark clouds in a weather mandated as sunny. Realism’s 
insistence on capacitating its protagonists is constitutive of the genre. Finally, its 
Enlightenment conviction that individuality is the priceless condition of human­
ity, that individuals negotiate their own lives against a complex yet manageable 
social backdrop, disposes realism toward moralized dramas of individual resolu­
tion. Given Sartre’s “live or tell,” realism chooses “tell” and labors cunningly to 
make it look like “live.”
In a number of courageous ways, modernism chooses “live,” and its work is cut 
out for it. Flow can you write about “live” without turning “live” into “tell”? Ulti­
mately you cannot, but the heroism of these three writers—a heroism regarded as 
naive and rarely attempted by postmodern followers—resides in their innovative 
attempts to do so. In their efforts to return the movement of being from dry land 
to being’s native water—its ongoing and unenlightened present—they brought 
more of the trouble of life in time and space into their narrative forms. The truth 
is, we are not knowing in the ways realism proposes. The larger part of our actual 
experience is uninsured by knowing. Our lives unfold in an unending present that 
becomes opaque whenever it escapes the grooves of habit or expectation. In real­
ity, we learn slowly in time, by dint of many repetitions. Nor do we own our space 
except in tentative, provisional, and short-term ways—our relation to the outer 
world resembles renting (or indeed borrowing) more than it does owning. For 
many aspects of our lives, we cease, after a certain point, to learn at all. Who is 
wise in love? Who even becomes wise in love? These are unfriendly truths about 
life in time and space, and the work of modernist fiction is to convey their impor­
tance while continuing to honor their unfriendliness. It is the “ungratefulness” of 
such labor—modernism’s putting into narrative what narrative seems designed to 
repress—for which we should be most grateful.
NOTES
1. A case could, of course, be made for other writers, but I focus on Proust, Kafka, 
and Faulkner because they are the supremely haunted modernists. They are haunted, not 
(as in Freud) by repressed sexuality, but more broadly and unpredictably—their texts 
intimating a sort of underweave of the socially unworkable. Among those writers missing 
from this essay, James Joyce is the indispensable, indeed iconic, modernist, yet Joyce’s
MODERNISM 319
texts are not revealingly haunted. The play of consciousness fills the pages of Ulysses.
He has little interest in repressed psychic materials; Bloomian consciousness is amply 
“streamed” onto the page. When Joyce wants to access his characters’ unacted desires, 
he invents in “Circe” less a discourse of subject repression than one of fantastic social 
carnival. Virginia Woolf, likewise, writes a modernist fiction centering on the dance 
of consciousnesses, not that which lies repressed beneath it. She produces in Septimus 
Smith a breathtaking case study in psychosis, not a neurotic who reveals symptomatically 
the psychic disturbances he ignores. One would not align him with the duplicities of a 
Charlus or Legrandin, the obsessions of a Quentin or Joe Christmas, the blankness of 
an unreadable Joseph K. Thomas Mann might well have a claim on my argument—his 
great work is laden with the collapse of exhausted Western norms—yet Hans Castorp (to 
take a telling instance) has little unconscious. Mann distributes Castorp’s possibilities 
into the array of surrounding characters atop the magic mountain, even as he plays out 
the implications of Aschenbach’s collapse into the surrounding Venetian setting and 
imagery. D. H. Lawrence, no less than Mann, was creatively attentive to the collapse 
of the “knowing subject,” but he is finally more interested, like Andre Gide and 
Hermann Hesse, in representing release than in dramatizing the kinds of arrest that are 
central here. I omit Robert Musil because his protagonists lack what Proust figures as 
“infrared”—an interior cathecting energy intimating that what lies beneath the surface 
is shaping unawares the surface itself. My point is less to disqualify all other modernist 
candidates than to shore up, briefly, the logic of this particular grouping. I should say, in 
closing this note, that the claims proposed throughout this essay derive from the book- 
length argument I make in Unknowing: The Work of Modernist Fiction (2005).
2. Stephen Kern draws on Eugene Minkowski (an early-twentieth-century French 
psychiatrist) to identify the two most prominent subject stances toward the future
in this period of technological explosion: “activity” and “expectation.” Minkowski 
aligned “activity” with instrumental, Cartesian man, reshaping the social (and natural) 
world as never before possible. But, in his psychiatric practice, Minkowski more often 
encountered “expectation.” Its terms are startlingly apt for Kafka: “ [Expectation] 
englobes the whole living being, suspends his activity, and fixes him, anguished.... It 
contains a factor of brutal arrest and renders the individual breathless. One might say 
that the whole of becoming, concentrated outside the individual, swoops down on him 
in a powerful hostile mass, attempting to annihilate him” (Kern 1983: 90). Impotence 
to master future space and time—this emerges as both Kafka’s narrative signature and 
a precise rebuke of Western technological man’s unprecedented mastery over space and 
time in the early twentieth century.
3. I emphasize here the nonnegotiable priority of the (single) subject in Kantian 
epistemology, but Richard Eldridge reminds me that, on the ethical plane, Kantian 
autonomy is everywhere doubled by (and weightless without) a larger social project of 
freedom for all, not just for the (single) subject. These two stances require each other 
even as, from the perspective governing my argument, the tensions between them are no 
less telling.
4. As Jean Laplanche has pointed out (1985:15-16), editor and translator James 
Strachey’s term “anaclisis” is unnecessarily erudite (derived from a Greek term that 
means “leaning”); Freud’s Anlehnung is a familiar noun for “leaning” or “propping.”
5. Since the term “anaclitic” is an important marker in my discussion of modernist 
fiction, I need to emphasize two points. First, although the term is Freudian, my usage 
of it is not. The readings that follow have everything to do with the sudden experience of 
defamiliarized space, but little to do with scenarios of repressed desire. Second, although
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I apply the term to realist practice, the Enlightenment narrative prefers to imagine the 
questing subject as a free-standing agent immersed in lawful, objective space and time: 
no “leaning” conceded. The burden of much of my analysis of that narrative was to 
unearth the “anaclitic” premises that—by making the spatial/temporal world amenable 
to subjective encounter and exploitation—underwrite realism’s progressive plot.
6. The following passage from Kierkegaard reads as presciently phenomenological:
A system for existence cannot be given. Is there, then, not such a system? That
is not at all the case__Existence itself is a system—for God, but it cannot
be a system for any existing spirit. System and conclusiveness correspond to 
each other, but existence is the very opposite— In order to think existence, 
systematic thought must think it as annulled and consequently as not existing. 
Existence is the spacing that holds apart; the systematic is the conclusiveness 
that brings together. (1968:107)
The world, for God, may be a system, but for us who exist in it, it can only be an 
unsystematic lifeworld. Our constitutive way of inhabiting space and time registers 
existence as a something “that holds apart,” not a “conclusiveness that brings together.”
7. If we wish to speak of repression here, it involves not a character’s desires but 
an entire representational schema’s will not to know. For realism will not “know” what 
modernism here grasps: that our compacts are ruptured by an immersion in time no 
longer domesticated but impersonally hostile to our project of renewed self-sameness.
8. Compare this vignette from Freud’s “The Uncanny”:
I was sitting along in my wagon-lit compartment when a more than usually 
violent jolt of the train swung back the door of the adjoining washing- 
cabinet, and an elderly gentleman in a dressing-gown and a traveling cap 
came in. I assumed that... he had taken the wrong direction and come into 
my compartment by mistake. Jumping up with the intention of putting him 
right, I at once realized to my dismay that the intruder was nothing but my 
own reflection in the looking glass on the open door. I can still recollect that I 
thoroughly disliked his appearance. (1955: 248 n.)
9. Heidegger strikingly echoes Proust when he describes (in “Building, Dwelling, 
Thinking”) the space we inhabit as aligned with our psychic investments rather than 
matching any surveyor maps: “When I go toward the door of the lecture hall, I am 
already there, and I could not go to it at all if I were not such that I am there. I am never 
here only, as the encapsulated body; rather, I am there, that is, I already pervade the space 
of the room, and only thus can I go through it” (1977a: 335)-
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